been the intention, when legislation was introduced to stop sexual harassment in the workplace, that such a claimant must declare his or her true sexual orientation in order to establish that the abuse was 'on grounds of sexual orientation'. ... The case would have been exactly the same if Mr English had elected ... to remain silent about his actual sexual orientation.... And the same would be the case if he were actually gay or bisexual but preferred not to disclose it.
The underlying consideration here is to protect homosexual (or bisexual) workers from being 'outed' by a systematic campaign of abuse. In such a pernicious scenario, the worker would have to suffer the abuse in silence unless or until he 'came out'. As such, this decision helps preserve the dignity of workers that discrimination law is supposed to enshrine (see the text of regulation 5 and Coleman v Attridge Law, ibid
In addition to harassment on protected grounds, sexual harassment is unlawful. The Sex Discrimination Act 1975, section 4A, prohibits 'conduct of a sexual nature that has the purpose or effect of violating her dignity or, of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for her ...' Although this is provided by the Sex Discrimination Act, its scope is not limited to male-to-female conduct, or the reverse. The perpetrator is 'a person' while the victim is 'her' or 'him' (s 4A (5)). Thus 'same-sex' sexual harassment is covered by this provision and even before the English decision, victims of sexual harassment were under no obligation to reveal their sexual orientation. The abuse of Mr English included 'sexual innuendo' and 'lurid comments' ([3]), and so the abuse would appear to amount to sexual harassment as well as sexual orientation harassment. No mention of this apparent oversight was made in the judgment. Indeed, Sedley LJ (see the extract above) appeared to confuse sexual harassment with harassment on the ground of sexual orientation. That said, not all cases of homophobic abuse will be of a sexual nature, and so regulation 5 and this decision are not redundant.
The most obvious principle to emerge from this decision is that victims of sexual orientation harassment are under no obligation to disclose their sexual orientation to succeed. Thus, workers cannot be 'outed' by a campaign of harassment. Accordingly, victims of religious harassment should not be obliged to disclose their religion, and so on.
More broadly, the case draws attention to the numerous possibilities when defining harassment (or direct discrimination), which could be restricted to the claimant's protected status, or extended to cover perhaps, 'third-party' discrimination, perceived discrimination, and conduct unrelated to any particular person's condition. Various versions appear inconsistently and incoherently across the domestic legislation, and those definitions falling short of the broad possibility confirmed in English, fall short of the consistently broad definition provided by the predominant EC Directives.
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